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Abstract
This chapter reviews Kenya's expériences with policy reforms in the staple food maize market.
Escalating fiscal costs associated with intensive government involvement in the grain markets
motivated the World Bank and the IMF to promote the 'liberalization' of marketing and
pricing Systems in the food market as a central component of the 'structural adjustment
programmes' (SAP) implemented throughout Africa in the 1980s. As maize trade and pricing
greatly affect Kenya's food security, this chapter attempts to tracé the implications of maize
market reforms for the various actors in the maize sector: producers, traders, millers, consumers
and the state itself. There are five parts. Section 3.2 discusses the theoretical basis of SAPs and
the anticipated conséquences for food security. Section 3.3 describes the characteristics of
Kenya's maize market prior to the reforms. Section 3.4 analyses the politics of the reform
process and the emerging new setting of the maize market. Décisive reform Implementation
only commenced in 1994 when the maize trade was fully liberalized and private traders began
to participate in the market. This period is analyzed in Section 3.5 and is followed by the
conclusions in the final section.
The Kenyan government has long been reluctant to 'leave the maize market to the
workings of the market forces'. The state marketing board, the NCPB, still holds a dominant
position continuing to set the annual maize priée for producers and to purchase a substantial
part of the marketed maize.
From a food security point of view, the major bénéficiantes of the reforms have been the
urban consumers. Maize flour priées in the urban areas have dropped considerably, largely as
the outcome of increased compétition in the maize milling industry. Unfortunately, knowledge
of the conséquences of market reforms for Kenya's rural consumers and smallholder maize
producers is still unsatisfactory. A tentative analysis of recent priée developments in rural maize





The international fînancial institutions (IMF and World Bank) responsible for the design of
'structural adjustment programmes' (SAPs), and other donors involved in Africa's
development, have reached the conclusion that African governments, through their
interventions in the agricultural and food sector, have failed to secure reliable food supplies
at stable and affordable priées for their populations (with the exception of the urban
population to which food policies were often heavily biased). State food marketing boards in
particular, which were granted a monopoly position in their food procurement and pricing
activities, have been blamed for their inadequate performance, operating at high costs and
causing a serious drain on the state budget. Their inefficiency and ineffectiveness are also
thought to have contributed to low producer priées and a generally ill-functioning domestic
food marketing System.
Consequently, 'structural adjustment' called for the end of government involvement in
the pricing and marketing of agricultural produce. This policy reform would pave the way
for ultimately 'liberalized' (or rather privatized) markets.1 The replacement of the state
boards by private marketing agents was expected to result in not only a better fulfilment of
the marketing tasks but also in substantially lower costs. This would allow for positive
incentive margins for both traders and processors and a higher priée for food producers,
thus stimulating the growth of food output. But consumer food priées were also expected to
rise, as existing food subsidies were being reduced or entirely removed. This effect,
however, was believed to be offset by a counter move to lower consumer priées made
possible by thé lower operating costs of the private marketing system.
This chapter seeks to confront SAP theory with thé Kenyan expériences of food
market reforms. It concentrâtes on thé marketing of maize for two reasons. First, maize is
thé staple food of thé large majority of thé Kenyan population. It provides some 45 per cent
of calorie intake of the average Kenyan household and over 90 per cent of Kenya's farmers
are involved in maize production (Smith, 1992, 2). Second, Kenya has a long tradition,
stemming from thé colonial period, of extensive government priée control and market
régulations in its maize sector. Since thé early 1980s thé World Bank and other donors have
been pressing the Kenyan government to reduce its rôle in thé pricing and marketing of its
staple food.2
As maize represents a crucial commodity in thé food security record of the majority of
thé Kenyan population, it is important to examine how a de-controlled maize market impacts
on the factors that détermine food security at différent levels. At thé level of individual
households a relevant question is if maize market liberalization helps (1) to increase a
The term 'liberalized' conveys a positive message. It suggests that a market 'freed' from government
intervention and régulation performs better! In thé literature the term 'liberalization' refers to thé
relaxation of regulatory controls on private marketing, whereas 'privatization' implies a withdrawal of
state agencies from pricing and marketing (Jayne & Jones, 1997, 1505).
Marketing arrangements and priée formation processes are closely interrelated and are therefore often
discussed simultaneously.
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household's ability to produce more food for self-consumption or (2) to enhance its capacity
(purchasing power) to buy thé required food in thé market. And as thé priée of food is a
crucial déterminant of food security for consumers and producers alike, questions about how
far food priées are affected by market reforms become of central importance.
Furthermore, at the sectoral level, relevant issues include: the effect of market
liberalization on thé level of, and the yearly fluctuations in, overall maize production
(national food security). And finally, from a régional point of view, the question of whether
market liberalization will facilitate thé flow of maize from surplus to deficit areas in the
country (regional food security) needs attention.
For a proper understanding of the factors at work it is argued that next to a 'technical-
economistic' orientation a 'political-economic' approach is necessary. This is because in
African conditions, food Systems are highly politicized and 'patronized' by thé politically
powerful. Often political interests and considérations in thé food policy-making process tend
to overrule sound economie arguments. This makes an analysis in strict économie terms
(which is typical for most of SAP design and theoretical reasoning) largely miss its mark.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefïy outlines thé theoretical basis of
SAP reforms and thé anticipated effects on food security. In Section 3.3, the focus is on thé
long-term characteristics of Kenya's maize market. It discusses thé motivations of heavy
government intervention and thé résultant outcomes and tries to explain the reluctance of the
Kenyan government to comply with SAP 'market liberalization' demands. Sections 3.4 and
3.5 look at the period starting in December 1993, when thé Kenyan government finally gave
in to thé World Bank/IMF conditionalities. Hère thé various actors involved in thé market
(producers, traders, millers, consumers and government itself) who have all responded
differently to reforms are considered in an attempt to pinpoint the 'winners and losers' in the
new maize market setting.
3.2 Structural adjustment: theoretical framework and rationale
The World Bank (WB) and thé International Monetary Fund (IMF) are thé originators of the
'structural adjustment programmes' in Africa. The général diagnosis of the IMF/WB
involves thé notion that macro imbalances and domestic supply constraints are at the root of
Africa's ongoing crisis. Excessive déficits in thé balance of payments (external imbalance)
and thé government's budget (internai disequilibrium) were caused by a combination of
external and internai developments.
External shocks in thé 1970s included thé two oil crises, thé recession and tariff
protection in thé industrialized western countries, thé terms of trade détérioration, thé higher
interest rates and an overall diminished demand for Africa's traditional exports on thé world
markets. These events gave lise to a rapid worsening of thé balance of payment position in a
gréât number of African countries at the beginning of the 1980s.
Internally thé situation was exacerbated by thé conséquences of mistaken development
policies. Thèse included: inappropriate exchange-rate policies (overvaluation of the local
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currency), disincentive trade policies, heavy taxation of farmers' output and an over-
extended and inefficiënt public and parastatal sector. Soon, government expenditures began
to far exceed revenues and led to serious budget déficits, impeding the growth of domestic
supplies of goods and services. Constraints on growth of production were also thought to
emanate from excessive government régulation of, and participation in, economie
transactions and décision making. This caused 'distortions' in the market and price
formation processes and led to the unproductive allocation of scarce resources.
Not surprisingly the proposed remedy involved a substantially reduced rôle for African
governments in the functioning of the economy. Financial resources were to be switched
from the public to the private sector and from consumption to productive investments. More
funds in the hands of private producers, accompanied by a proper price incentive structure,
would lead to increased output, more employment and rising incomes for the African
population. A move towards market-driven économies was also expected to produce
internationally compétitive goods and services, which would contribute to the foundation of
a sustained, export-led growth of production. Correct price signais are crucial and are
anticipated to effectively work their way through all (monetized) sectors of the economy
where markets of different types (for products, inputs, labour, land and capital) are well
integrated and operate efficiently and smoothly. These are the characteristics of the type of
economy envisaged by international bankers to be the best guarantee for sustained economie
growth and welfare improvement (World Bank, 1989 and 1994). Economie price signais
and well-integrated, efficiently operating markets are the essential building blocks of
Standard SAP reasoning.
The agricultural sector, and small farmers in particular, are expected to benefit from
three types of reforms: a) an end to past policies of high export taxes and overvaluation of
the national currency. Dévaluation (and the subséquent producer price rises) combined with
internai decontrolling of price formation is assumed to enhance agricultural output; b)
improved domestic marketing of agricultural produce. The replacement of inefficiënt
parastatal marketing boards by private traders tends to lead to substantially lower operating
costs of marketing activities. Gains resulting from more efficiency in the marketing System
are assumed to translate into higher producer priées and c) reforms in international trade
régulations. Liberalization of import/export régulations, in the form of reduced (or
completely removed) tariffs, quotas and subsidies are also expected to clear the way for
increased export trade and production in the agricultural sector.
It must be remembered that from the outset SAPs were not designed with the explicit
goal of improving the food security conditions of the African population. Indeed, food
security considérations did not rank high on the list of SAP priority objectives. The focus
was first and foremost on exportable agricultural commodities which were expected to earn
badly needed export revenues. Nevertheless market and related price reforms (as central
éléments of SAPs) have conséquences for the food security of different socio-economic
groups. The main analytical task is men to assess how food markets (and other types of
markets in which households operate) are altered under the process of SAP implementation
and how these changes in market conditions in turn affect the crucial déterminants of
Maize marketing m Kenya 47
household (and other levels of) food security. In particular, changes in: a) producer and
consumer priées and b) food availability in urban and rural markets should be the subject of
analysis.3
Food priée lises may resuit in higher incomes for food producing households, at least
if there is a production surplus that can be sold on the market. But a substantial proportion of
the food producing households in sub-Saharan Africa are also food buyers on the market
(when household stocks are depleted).4 Households are then confronted with the adverse
effect of higher retail priées. The net outcome dépends on the household's own-produced
food to food purchased ratio. Furthermore a dévaluation of the national currency (a priority
measure in SAP implementation) tends to increase farmers' costs of imported agricultural
inputs (fertilizer, fuel, etc.) and consequently partly to offset the advantages of a food price
rise.
So much for theory and the (sometimes hidden) assumptions incorporated in the
theoretical framework. The remainder of the chapter will concentrate on the actual workings
of Kenya's maize marketing system and our knowledge of the conséquences of the changes
brought about by the refbrms.
3.3 Maize marketing and pricing in Kenya: before the reforms
Maize like any other commodity traded in a marketing system increases in value as it moves
through the marketing channel from the farmer to the retail selling point. The value also
increases when it is stored between harvests and if it is processed (milled and packaged).
Different marketing functions are performed by different actors in the market chain. The
opérations of the actors are in turn affected by policies pursued by the state and a range of
non-policy, agri-technical and socio-cultural variables (Thorbecke, 1992, 4). A proper
understanding of each of the participating actors' rôles and their behavioural déterminants is
a prerequisite for a meaningful analysis. But before focusing on the actor groups in the
maize market, a brief overview of the trend in national supplies of maize over the years is
called for.
These are but two factors determining household food security. A host of other factors play a rôle
including community support mechanisms and kinship and lineage relations, nutrition knowledge and
eating habits, food storage and processing facilities, market infrastructure, health and sanitary conditions,
décision making on the allocation of household expenditures, women's work load and time use, wars and
conflicts, and droughts and environmental dégradation. These complex inter-acting factors make an SAP-
food security analysis a difficult exercise.
The percentage of farming households unable to produce enough food to last from one harvest to the next
varies with time and place, but is often surprisingly high according to empirical fmdings. Sijm (1997,
63ff) notes that in Mali during the 1980s 'probably one half of the farm households did not produce
enough to meet their consumption requirements'. Corresponding figures for Malawi and Tanzania reach as




In Kenya almost all fanners (large- and small-scale) are involved in the cultivation of maize.
But under the prevailing rain-fed conditions, harvests have shown gréât variation in the last
20 years (Figure 3.1). The serious déclines in the drought years of 1979/80, 1984/85,
1992/93 and 1996 are well recorded. Production levels fluctuated from a low 1.4 million
tons in the drought year of 1984/85 to over 3 million tons in the record year of 1994. It
seems that in the fifteen-year period (1975/76 -1989/90) maize production more or less kept
up with the rate of population growth. In this period the five-year average rose from 1.8
million tons per year in 1975-1980 to 2.0 million tons in 1981-1985 and 2.5 million tons
yearly in 1986-1990 (see Appendix). This volume of 2.5 million tons was assumed in 1990
to be enough to attain self-sufficiency (World Bank, 1991, 1). However, in thé 1991-1996
period thé yearly average dropped slightly to 2.46 million tons. Taking into considération an
average population growth rate of 3 per cent, this would indicate that the country slipped
back to a maize output level lower than thé self-sufficiency benchmark. As is clearly shown
in the diagram, variations in maize production in thé 1993-1996 period were extremely high:
from a record harvest of 3 million tons in 1994 - a rise of 46 per cent! compared to thé 2
million tons of thé preceding year - to 2.2 million tons in 1996. This kind of variation
causes considérable priée fluctuations and bas serious implications for national food security
and the workings of the maize marketing system.
Variability in maize output is also reflected in the occurrence of exports and imports.
During the nine-year period 1980-1988, Kenya exported 923,000 tons of maize and in the
same period imported 1,021,000 tons, resulting in a net-inflow of around 100,000 tons
(World Bank, 1991,2). In the first half of the 1990s the net inflow increased dramatically to
over 520,000 tons which may also be interpreted as a sign of lagging domestic production.
The planted acreage increased steadily (due to the introduction of hybrid maize) until
the end of the 1980s when it levelled off at 1.4 million hectares (see Appendix). Statistical
analysis indicates that the relationship between planted areas and production levels is
strong.5 Nearly two-thirds of the variation in production was explained by variation in the
planted area. This implies that the area cultivated, rather than the yield, has been the
determining factor for maize output growth. Maize yields stabilized at levels between 1,500
and 2,000 kg per hectare throughout the 1976-1996 period (see Appendix). Stagnation in
land productivity is another worrying feature of Kenya's food sector. Given Kenya's overall
shortage of good quality agricultural land, it is beyond any doubt that a radical intensification
of maize production through increased use of agricultural inputs and the adequate provision
of agricultural services is an absolute sine qua non for future food security.
5 The Pearson corrélation coefficient is O 80.
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Note: Data are in the Appendix.
Marketing
A large proportion (70 per cent) of Kenya's maize production is provided by small-scale
producers with thé remainder being produced by medium- and large-scale farmers (Karanja,
1992, 139).6But when marketed maize output is considered the situation is reversed: large
maize farmers market around 75 per cent of their production and smallholders only 25 to 30
per cent. Smallholder producers often intercrop maize with beans whereas large maize
producers grow maize in pure stand. The latter in most cases own farm machinery and have
access to formai crédit institutions. Smallholders are generally self-fmancing and hâve to rely
on (more expensive) informai crédit sources when they hâve to pay for services or inputs.
Large farmers deliver their maize surplus directly to thé National Cereals Produce Board
(NCPB) depots. Most of these depots are situated near railway stations. (The railway runs
through the heart of the large-scale farm région, the former White Highlands.) Many large
farmers have their own vehicles or can easily hire them in order to transport maize to the
depots.
Significantly, only a small portion of Kenya's total maize production fïnds its way into
the marketing System. For the 1983-1989 period an average share of 41 per cent was
estimated (Argwings-Kodhek, 1993, 333). The remainder is retained for seed and home-
consumption. This relatively small proportion of marketed maize reflects the predominantly
Kenyan statistics define smallholders as farmers with 8 ha or less, medium-scale farmers have between 9
and 20 ha and large-scale producers more than 20 ha.
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subsistence nature of maize cultivation in Kenya. Obviously, a situation of thin food markets
reduces the scope for 'économies of scale' in marketing and transport.
Prior to the market reforms, Kenya had a dual maize marketing system consisting of
an officially regulated, state-controlled sector which predominantly served the large-scale,
commercial maize farmers and a parallel, unofficial sector where smallholders traded small
quantities at local markets.
In theory, nearly all marketed maize7 was to enter the state-controlled NCPB marketing
board (founded in 1979 after the merger between the Maize and Produce Board and the
Wheat Board). This government parastatal was granted a legal monopoly to purchase,
distribute and import maize. By 1987 the NCPB operated 60 depots and over 600 buying
centres throughout the country (Government of Kenya, 1988,42). But by far the largest part
of the NCPB's purchases (85 per cent) came from the two western provinces of Rift Valley
and Western which form the major maize producing areas of Kenya. Rift Valley alone
provided two-thirds of the total NCPB maize purchases (World Bank, 1991, 14; Kliest,
1985, 43).
The official NCPB system predominantly served the large-scale producers and
Kenya's urban population. Most (80 to 90 per cent) of the NCPB's sales of maize went to
large millers8 in the three major urban areas: Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu (Ikiara, 1998,
102). The neglect of rural consumers was largely due to the implicit assumption that the rural
population produced enough to meet its own requirements (Jayne & Jones, 1997, 1512).
Essentially the pre-reform maize marketing system was characterized by a circuitous,
expensive flow of maize from the NCPB depots in surplus régions to large-scale millers in
urban areas, where it was milled at subsidized margins and then sent back as maize meal to
the rural areas (Jayne & Jones, 1997, 1515). The margins granted to the large roller milis
were much higher than those for the small posho milis which mainly operate in rural areas.
It is not clear how much of Kenya's total marketed maize under this system flowed
into the official system, that is, into the NCPB depots. The World Bank estimated this share
at 80 per cent in 1981/82 (World Bank, 1991, 14). But another WB publication puts the
figure at 50 per cent (World Bank, 1986, 148). Maritim, in his comprehensive study on
Kenya's maize sector, concluded that in 1974/75 no more than 40 per cent of all marketed
maize entered the NCPB depots (Maritim, 1982, 21). And Jabara estimated a figure of 45-50
per cent for marketed maize sold to the official marketing system (Jabara, 1985, 615). Most
likely, the NCPB share has fluctuated over time. Moreover, in years of abondant harvests
the NCPB was often unable to absorb the maize that farmers offered for sale.
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that a great deal of Kenya's marketed maize was
handled not by the controlled, official marketing system but in the parallel marketing sub-
system. Maritim (1982, 21) estimated that 60 per cent of all marketed maize in Kenya was
Movements of up to two bags of maize across district boundaries and 10 bags within districts were free,
and did not require a transport permit issued by the NCPB.
Maize is overwhelmingly consumed in milled (flour) form. In urban areas large milis produce refmed
'sifted meal' maize while in the rural areas (and to a limited extent also in urban areas) so-called hammer
milis produce a whole or posho type of maize meal.
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traded in rural local markets where priées and the volumes exchanged were determined by
the supply and demand conditions prevailing in that spécifie locality. Here the official priées
set by the government, as part of its food priée policy, were largely ineffective. Likewise,
government régulations to restrict movement of maize across district and provincial
boundaries (as the second characteristic of the official food policy) were generally evaded.
Bribery of police and local administrators and 'smuggling' were common practices.
The unofficial marketing sub-system served in particular the large number of small-
scale maize producers (up to 70 per cent of their marketed production was handled in this
sub-system) and by far the majority of rural consumers (World Bank, 1986, 148).
Unfortunately, the significance of the parallel market sub-system in Kenya is often under-
estimated in writings on marketing issues. The excessive attention paid to the merits and
shortcomings of the official, government-controlled maize marketing sub-system is
misplaced. It tends to ignore the market conditions faced by the larger part of the Kenyan
population living in rural areas and often in locations beyond the reach of official marketing
régulations. Here, food markets need not be 'liberalized' as they have never been subject to a
fïrm 'government policy grip' (especially with regard to priée formation).
Pricing
As a result of the dual marketing System, priées paid to farmers differed. Official priées were
especially relevant to large-scale maize producers as they delivered directly to the NCPB
depots. The policy of official pricing did not, however, affect the majority of Kenya's small-
scale farmers. Here producers (and consumers) had to rely on local markets and local traders
as the main actors in the priée formation process. It is estimated that of the total smallholder
marketed output only 30 per cent found its way to the NCPB depots (Meilink, 1985, 26).
The objectives of the official producer pricing policy (prior to the SAP reforms) were
formulated in the "Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1981" and included the following: a) to provide
incentives to farmers in order to encourage them to expand food production and to attain
broad national self-sufficiency; b) to achieve that goal, producer priées at the farm-gate
would be related to longer-term import parity priées (Government of Kenya, 1981, 16).
Producer price setting by the government has always been a complex and delicate
exercise. This is not only because conflicting interests are involved, but also because
marketed supplies are highly unpredictable due to factors beyond the control of pricing
policies. There is no direct relationship between the price offered to farmers and the level of
maize production because a host of other influences combine to détermine actual maize
output besides the set price level. These include public and private investment in the
agricultural sector, storage facilities, input availability and their pricing, agricultural
technology research, land policy, credit arrangements, the proper functioning of markets,
timely payments to farmers and above all sufficient and timely rainfall.
In fixing the producer price for maize, the government made less and less use of the
'cost of production' criterion and gradually moved to 'import and export parity priées' as
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guidelines. 9 In retrospect, the official priées paid were not unfavourable. Attractive pricing
echoed the colonial policy which involved relatively high priées paid to settler grain
producers (Heyer, 1976, 317). After independence this policy was continued. In the 1980s
official nominal priées for maize producers rose from Ksh 86 per 90 kg bag in 1980 to Ksh
239 in 1990. After the 1991 drought, priées were pushed up from Ksh 275 in 1991 to Ksh
729 in 1993 (Table 3.1).
Taking 1982 as a base year, the index for agricultural input priées, on the other hand,
rose from 222 in 1991 to 350 in 1993 (Government of Kenya, 1995, Table 8.6). Thus the
increase in input costs for farmers in the 1990s was significantly less than the increase in
their output priées. It can therefore be concluded that the producer priée policy pursued by
the Kenyan government acted as an incentive for maize producing farmers.
When applying the import panty priée criterion, this conclusion is confirmed. The
World Bank estimated that producer priées hovered around 75 per cent of import parity
during the 1980s and were nearing import parity levels in the early 1990s (World Bank,
1994, 82; Swamy, 1994, 220).
During the 1980s official consumer priées10 for milled maize (posho meal) increased
rapidly from a nominal Ksh 1.65 per kg in 1980 to Ksh 5.14 in 1990, a rise of 212 per cent.
When compared to the change in the 'consumer priée index' in the same period, retail food
priées rose more than the overall index (World Bank, 1991,54).n Increases were even more
rapid in the 1990s: from Ksh 5.14 in 1990 to Ksh 13.88 per kg in 1993, a rise of 170 per
cent in three years (Table 3.1). Inflation during the same period showed an increase of only
127 per cent (Government of Kenya, 1996, Table 4.19).
These price developments underline the fact that, in contrast to elsewhere in Africa,12
during the 1980-1993 period food consumers in Kenya were not protected from inflation.13
The last column of Table 3.1 indicates that maize producers received a share of the
consumer price which fluctuated between 67 per cent (1983) and 42 per cent (1986 and
1992). Although the share was higher in the fïrst half of the 1980s there is, however, no
clear indication of the marketing sector14 taking an increasing share of the consumer price
during the 1980 -1993 period. Rather the pattern is one of fluctuating shares.
These priées are relevant for commodities (tradables) entering international trade. They represent a
référence point in measuring the opportunity costs of a country's exports and imports. In a situation
where imports and exports are completely liberalized, the 'parity maize pricing' policy is supposed to
clear the market internationally. However, at the time the (official) producer price is fixed and announced,
it is uncertain whether this price will eventually turn out to be the 'equilibrium price' Another
complicating factor in the process of setting the right (market clearing) price is the wide price range
between import and export parity priées, due to the extremely high transport and handling costs of maize
in Kenya.
Consumer priées are thé retail maize flour priées included in thé Nairobi 'cost of living index' as
published in the Statistical Abstract.
The maize consumer price index during thé 1980s rosé from 100 (1980) to 303 (1989) while thé total
consumer price index increased to 241 in thé same period.
12 In Africa a policy of low, subsidized urban food priées was widely adopted.
13 Maize consumer priées after 1993 were not available at the time of writing as the Statistical Abstract of
1994 was the latest issue to have been published.
14 Defmed here as encompassing all actors • traders, transporter and millers.
10
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Table 3.1 Maize: Official producer priées, consumer priées, 'priée spread' and

















































































Sources: Producer priées are from Economie Survey 1987, 107 and 1997, 126. Consumer pnces are from Stansti-
cal Abstract, 1991 and 1994 respectively, Tables 234 and 230. These are Nairobi retaü pnces for whole-
meal posho maize
Note: 'price spread' is the consumer pnce minus the producer pnce in Ksh per kg.
As we saw, the 'outreach' of official pricing was restricted to NCPB opérations and urban
millers and consumers. Maize priées in rural Kenya were largely unaffected by official pri-
cing, but determined by the prevailing local market forces of supply and (effective) demand.
A review of studies analyzing food price movements in these rural markets reveals
substantial price variations, both regional and seasonal, even between adjacent areas
(Meilink, 1987, 24ff). This finding supports the widely held view that the government's
policy of restricting private food transports, within and across districts, has only worked to
aggravate seasonal and regional price fluctuations in Kenya's rural markets (Schmidt, 1979;
Maritim, 1982; Booker & Githongo, 1983; Ateng, 1984; Food supply monitoring project
seminar, 1985). The variation of (uncontrolled) local market priées is illustrated in Table
3.2.
Average provincial priées for a bag of maize (90 kg) in different markets in thé same
year show an erratic pattern of variation. Hère we consider thé variation in thé pre-reform
period, recorded in thé first four columns. In 1990 thé differential between thé highest price
(Coast) and thé lowest price (Nyanza) amounted to Ksh 108. In 1991 there was a différence
of Ksh 210 between thé highest price (Rift Valley) and thé lowest price (Eastern). In 1992
thé différence was extremely large: Ksh 642(!) between the high (Central) price and thé low
(Eastern) price. And in 1993 thé price differential of Ksh 489 between the high (Eastern)
price and thé low (Nyanza) price also indicates thé wide range of régional price variation in
maize traded in thé same year in various local markets in Kenya's rural areas. Clearly
towards 1993, priées in ail rural markets increased very rapidly (in many cases threefold in
three years).
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These policy considérations go far towards explaining the persistent reluctance,
throughout the 1980s, to give in to pressures for marketing reforms emanating from the DVIF
and the World Bank regarding 'structural adjustment' conditionalities. Over the years
numerous atterapts to liberalize food marketing have been unsuccessfully tried (Mosley,
1991, 109).
But in 1987, when once again a reform proposai was formulated in the 'Cereal Sector
Reform Programme' (CSRP) initiated by European Community donors, the Kenyan
government seemed prepared to take action. The conditions attached to the World Bank's
'sectoral adjustment loan' agreed with the government in 1986 and the escalating costs of the
NCPB's opérations in the fïrst half of the 1980s had certainly contributed to the readiness of
the government to implement the policy change.15
The reform's aim was to scale down the rôle of the NCPB in maize marketing through
a series of measures: a) the création of a network of 'licensed buying agents' (LB A's)16 who
were allowed to purchase maize on behalf of the NCPB (and could also engage in maize
trade on their own account) and along with this the réduction of the number of NCPB depots
in the rural areas; b) to raise the amount of freely transportable maize from 2 to 10 bags
across district boundaries; c) large urban millers were allowed to purchase 20 per cent of
their maize supplies directly from traders and coopératives (the remaining part still had to be
purchased from the NCPB); and finally d) the financial position of the NCPB was to be
improved by writing off of its accumulated debts to the Treasury (financed by the European
Community) and the füll subvention of the NCPB's future functions by the Ministry of
Finance. Furthermore a 'erop purchase revolving fund' was to be introduced in order to
enable the NCPB to make timely payments to farmers and trader agents.
NCPB tasks were scaled down to: a market stabilization function (through floor and
ceiling market priées); to maintaining a national food security stock; and finally (continued)
commercial opérations in the maize market, in füll compétition with private traders. It was
expected that financial support from the Treasury would enable the NCPB to reduce its into-
depot and ex-depot margin while still being able to compete with private traders (Smith,
1992, 13).
By mid 1992, five years after the introduction of CSRP reforms, the progress made
was far from impressive. Although restrictions on inter-district maize movements were
further relaxed to free transportation of 44 bags in 1991 and raised further to 88 bags in
1992 (Argwings-Kodhek et al, 1993, 333), mention is made of the 'reluctance' of the
district level bureaucrats to adhère to this measure and of the continued practice by local
police of harassing traders and demanding fines (Lewa & Hubbar, 1995, 576). Moreover, in
October 1992 the movement of maize was entirely banned before the December 1992
élections and not lifted until the end of 1993 (ibid, 575). This exemplifies the strong
involvement of 'Kenyan high politics' in food marketing issues.
15
16
The European Community financed the Cereal Sector Reform Programme (CSRP) which was carried out
in the period 1988-1992 . Other donors such as the World Bank, USAID and the IMF also participated.
This was not a new phenomenon as in the early 1980s, prior to the establishment of the NCPB buying
centres, LBAs were also appointed, They later gave way to the new NCPB depots.
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3.5 A liberalized maize market?
Although only a few years have passed since the effective liberalization of the maize market
(in 1994), a number of profound changes hâve occurred affecting thé various actors in thé
maize marketing chain (thé NCPB, farmers, traders, millers and consumers) in différent
ways. Thèse changes must now be reviewed.
The NCPB
One of thé pressing problems to be solved in thé liberalized maize market is the new design
of the state marketing agent (NCPB) now facing compétition from the private sector. Events
in the first years testify to the diffïculties the Kenyan authorities had with accepting the new
conditions. In particular, there was a growing fear that food policy objectives (that is
ensuring food security, especially in urban areas) would be jeopardized under the new
System.
The NCPB had actually lost ground in maize marketing in the early 1990s. In 1989
about 24 per cent of the total maize production was delivered to the board but by 1993 this
had fallen to a mere 15 per cent (Dciara, 1995, 37). In an attempt not to be outdone by the
private traders, the government decided to raise the NCPB's buying price to Ksh 855 (per
90 kg bag) for the following agricultural year. However, in that year (1994/95) Kenya
experienced a bumper maize harvest of over 3 million tons due to favourable rainfall. In
addition, large volumes of maize (8 million bags) were imported after thé drought of
1992/93. Private traders, responding to thé liberalized import policy, imported 3 million
bags themselves. As a resuit of this abundant supply, retail priées dropped spectacularly
from Ksh 1,400 per 90 kg bag in June 1994 to Ksh 400 in January 1995 (EIU, 1995,17).17
Though favourable for consumers, thé maize producers suffered from not being able to seil
their surplus maize and complained bitterly.18
In 1995 thé government reacted by instructing thé NCPB to accelerate its purchases
from farmers in order to secure their market outlets. This exercise added an estimated Ksh 3
billion ($ 8 million) to public spending (although farmers had to wait several months for
their money) and also added to thé irritation of the donors, who once again witnessed
increased government intervention in thé maize market.
In late 1995, President Moi, responding to renewed donor pressure, announced major
changes with regard to NCPB opérations. It was directed to buy and seil maize only at
market priées from then on and to continue to keep a stratégie reserve of 3 million bags for
food security reasons. Furthermore hè promised the donors that the board would be fully
commercialized by thé end of 1996 and that it would be free to export maize to fund its
payments to farmers (in October 1995 the board still owed maize and wheat farmers an
17
18
Since production costs were bet ween Ksh 450 and Ksh 1000 per 90 kg bag depending on thé région,
farmers had to seil at a loss.
The Minister for Agriculture, Mr Simeon Nyachae, imposed a 6-month ban on imports in August 1994
to ensure a market outlet for Kenyan producers. Soon, however, the ban was lifted and replaced by an
import duty and a dumping tax (The Daily Nation, 29/11/1994).
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Table 3.3 Kenya: Post-reform official producer prices for maize
(1993-1996; nominal prices)









Source Economie Survey, 1997, 126, denved from Table 8 4
For farmers (and consumers) in the local, rural markets, prices during the reform period
showed quite a different pattern, as is illustrated by the last three columns of Table 3.2.
Rapidly increasing prices in the structurally maize-deficit Coast province are striking.
Throughout the reform period prices here were far higher than in any other province in
Kenya. There is little évidence in Table 3.2 to suggest that farmers and rural consumers
elsewhere (outside Coast Province) faced less régional priée variability in the first years of
trade liberalization than before. In 1994 the regional differential between the highest and
lowest market priée amounted to Ksh 792. In 1995 it was only Ksh 89 but in 1996 it went
up to Ksh 489 per 90 kg bag.
The traders
The large majority of maize traders m Kenya are locally based retailers and small market
traders who typically handle between five and ten bags a week with a working capital of no
more than Ksh 10,000 ($200). Trade activities are not confïned to maize only. Most traders
combine it with the buying and selling of wheat, beans, millet, sorghum, rice, cassava and
potatoes. The majority hire transport (matalus or minibuses, handcarts or pick-ups) to move
the maize to the selling points. The latter may be a NCPB buying centre or alternatively a
local market. Generally it has been feit that the most profitable activity was retailing, in
contrast to buying maize at the farm-gate and transporting it further along the trade channel
(Ddara, 1995, 61).
The only traders involved in inter-district trade are the larger transporters/distributors.
Most of them own lorries and trucks and many are involved in maize transports to and from
the large milis and also in international trade with Tanzania and Uganda whenever price
differentials allow profitable opérations. As noted above, in 1993, large volumes of maize
flour flowed into the country, mainly from Uganda as a resuit of import liberalization
following the 1992 drought. Liberalization was generally welcomed by the larger traders
who reacted by importing massive volumes of maize from Uganda (EIU, second quarter
1995, 15).1»
Unfortunately, not much is known about the évolution of inter-district maize
movements after the reforms. Therefore the important question as to whether small-scale
traders have been able to expand their rôle in the maize trade remains largely unanswered.
19 Later the Kenyan government réimposée a ban on maize Imports after complaints by the large farmers.
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liberalization,21 indicate that between the surveys, the price of sifted meal dropped from Ksh
20.70 per kg to Ksh 15.33 (-26 per cent) and for wholemeal even more, from Ksh 14.46 to
Ksh 9.71 (-33 per cent). It was estimated that 40 per cent of this décline could be attributed
to the lower milling margins and 60 per cent to lower maize grain priées resulting from the
good 1995 harvest. Jayne & Argwings-Kodhek (1997,451) estimate that the total gain to
Nairobi's consumers amounted to Ksh 525 million (over $10 million) in one year. They
conclude that the removal of subsidies on roller milled maize meal was largely compensated
for by the lifting of restrictions on private maize movements and that urban food security
improved as access to cheaper whole maize flour increased (ibid, 456).
But whether rural households have also been able to benefit from increased maize
supplies at lower market priées remains uncertain due to a lack of empirical research. Table
3.2 provides an inconclusive picture. Although in ail provinces (except thé Coast) priées
dropped considerably in 1995, they rosé again in 1996 in most provinces.
v
3.6 Conclusions
Since thé décision to fully liberalize thé Kenyan maize market was taken as late as December
1993, the time period over which I have been able to assess the outcomes of the reforms has
been rather short. Therefore my conclusions must be tentative. Despite profound changes in
maize trade and maize processing, the reform process has not yet been completed. The maize
marketing board, the NCPB, is still far from being 'commercialized'. This state body
continues to set the annual maize price for producers and also continues to purchase a
proportion of the total marketed maize. It seems that the government is still hésitant and lacks
the political commitment to scale down the NCPB's rôle to one of 'buyer and seller of last
resort'.
There is a need, on the part of the Kenyan government, to be more explicit and
establish a consistent policy with regard to the future rôle of the NCPB in the maize sector.
(The haphazard policies of the past have discouraged private investors.) There is also an
urgent need for a balanced policy concerning external maize trade and local production
stimuli. The events of 1993/1994 were a frustrating expérience for Kenya's maize producers
as they lost a substantial part of their market sales when private traders and large millers were
allowed to import maize freely and cheap imports flooded the country. Although, later,
measures were taken to restore market outlets for Kenyan farmers, it illustrâtes that a
complete and swift liberalization of maize imports may undermine incentives for badly
needed growth in domestic production. In this context the observed décline in planted maize
hectares in 1995 and 1996 (see Appendix) is a disturbing signal. Clearly, market reforms
need to generale a positive supply response among producers. If not, fully-fledged
liberalization will merely end up jeopardizing national food security objectives.
21 The two random Household level surveys were organized by a joint team of Egerton University and
Michigan State University. Details may be found in Jayne & Argwings-Kodhek (1997).
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Appendix on maize production in Kenya
Maize acreage, production and yield, 1976-1996





















































































Sources: (a) Government of Kenya, Statistical Abstract, vanous issues,
(b) FAOSTAT database for the 1990-1996 penod.
